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Abstract
We present a compiler that translates a multi-agent systems speciﬁcation given in
the formalism of Interpreted Systems into an SMV program. We show how an SMV
model checker can be coupled with a Kripke model editor (Akka) to allow for the
mechanical veriﬁcation of epistemic properties of multi-agent systems. We apply
this methodology to the veriﬁcation of a communication protocol — the dining
cryptographers.
1 Introduction
Formal logic is traditionally seen as a powerful tool in the analysis, represen-
tation, and interpretation of communication. With the advent of distributed
systems, logic, and formal methods, have provided two concrete tools to re-
searchers involved with issues relating to communication: a speciﬁcation lan-
guage, and a veriﬁcation mechanism.
Logic is used as a speciﬁcation language for communication when analysing
protocols and meaning of utterances of artiﬁcial languages, such as in the re-
cent application of speech-act theory to communication in multi-agent sys-
tems. Formal methods based on formal logic are used as a veriﬁcation mech-
anism in the analysis of properties of communication protocol for distributed
systems. This paper concerns the use of machinery based on logic for the
latter.
Veriﬁcation of communication protocols is generally performed either by
theorem provers or by model checkers. While theorem provers are established
technology, model checking [8] is a relatively recent technique for the veriﬁca-
tion of distributed systems, allowing for the mechanical veriﬁcation of prop-
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erties expressed by means of temporal formulae. Temporal logic is a powerful
formalism, but it is not expressive enough to represent the typical properties
we are typically concerned with in a multi-agent system: notably the knowl-
edge, and other attitudes such as desires and intentions, of the agents. J.
Halpern and M. Vardi suggested the use of model checking techniques in the
veriﬁcation of multi-agent systems in 1991 ([10]) by means of richer languages
including not only temporal operators but also epistemic, but it is only recently
that results along these lines have been achieved ([1,15,18,22,2,17,14,11,12]).
Irrespective of recent research, verifying a concrete communication proto-
col remains a non-trivial task. First one needs to give a concrete computational
model of the system — either by means of Petri nets, timed automata, etc.
Once this is given, one needs a tool that automatically builds the semantics
model for the system. This semantical model, typically a temporal model,
must then be used to interpret the language that is used to specify and verify
properties about the system. While some tools are available, to our knowledge
there is currently no uniﬁed platform available, that can assist the designer
in the process from concrete speciﬁcation of the diﬀerent automata for the
agents to the veriﬁcation of properties by means of a model checker able to
check logics richer than plain temporal logic. The diﬃculty with providing an
all-encompassing platform is that several issues are intertwined:
• What formalism — automata, Petri nets — is to be used to represent the
transitions in the components resulting from a communication protocol?
• What temporal model — Interpreted Systems, plain Kripke semantics — is
to be employed to represent the computation paths deﬁned by the low-level
description of the system?
• What logical language — temporal, epistemic, deontic — is to be employed
to represent crucial properties of the protocol under consideration?
• What particular symbolic representation — OBDD’s, SAT-based, etc — is
to be used for the model checking task?
• What speciﬁc model checker - NuSMV, Spin, etc — should be employed to
assist in the task?
Many competing options are enumerated above, and there is currently no
“correct way to proceed”, but rather, it seems to us, a spectrum of options are
available to investigate further for parties interested in these issues. In view of
making a contribution on the issues outlined above, in this paper we present
a tool that integrates traditional model checking techniques with Interpreted
Systems semantics [9]. Interpreted Systems are a powerful formalism to rea-
son about epistemic and temporal properties of a MAS. The tool presented
here allows for the veriﬁcation of static epistemic properties of an Interpreted
System (i.e. properties involving epistemic operators only). We argue that
this is suﬃcient in a number of cases; to support this claim, we apply the tool
to the veriﬁcation of a communication protocol—the protocol of the dining
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cryptographers [6].
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review the
main technical constructions used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we
present and discuss a methodology for checking epistemic properties of a MAS.
In Section 4 we present in some detail the tool that allows us to do so. In
Section 5 we show how this can be put to work on a widely discussed example
— the dining cryptographers.
2 Review of concepts and notation
2.1 Model Checking techniques
Given a program P , and a property that can be represented as a logical formula
ϕ in some logic, model checking techniques allow for the automatic veriﬁcation
of whether or not a model MP , representing the program P , satisﬁes the
formula ϕ.
In the last two decades there have been great advances in the eﬀective-
ness of this approach thanks to sophisticate data manipulation techniques.
Techniques based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs, [3]) have been used
to develop model checkers that are able to check large number of states ([4]).
Alternative approaches using automata have also been developed [20].
Software tools originated from these lines of research. SPIN (see [13])
exploits automata theory and related algorithms, while SMV [16] uses BDDs
to represent states and transitions. In this paper we will use NuSMV, a novel
implementation of SMV ([7]).
The input language of NuSMV allows for the speciﬁcation of a ﬁnite system
with diﬀerent levels of abstraction. In the simplest case, the input language
requires three main sections:
1. A section for variables declaration,
2. A section for variable initialisation,
3. A section for the description of the transition relation.
The following is an example of a NuSMV program. 2 :
MODULE main
VAR
request : boolean;
state : {ready, busy};
ASSIGN
init(state) := ready;
next(state) :=
case
state = ready & request = 1 : busy;
1 : {ready, busy};
esac;
2 From NuSMV tutorial, available at http://nusmv.irst.itc.it
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(the line "1 : {ready, busy};" is equivalent to an else condition in
traditional programming languages). Given the program above, NuSMV can
then be used to create a model associated with it, and then to model check
temporal formulae. For example, if we were to feed a NuSMV checker with
the CTL formula
AG((request=0) -> AF(state=ready)) 3
NuSMV would produce a counterexample.
Following this approach a large number of systems ranging from commu-
nication protocols to hardware components have been veriﬁed by means of
temporal languages. These are not agent systems, but standard distributed
processes. If we are to investigate whether we can apply this methodology to
agent veriﬁcation, we need to incorporate this technique with an agent based
semantics, like Interpreted Systems.
2.2 Interpreted Systems
Interpreted Systems [9] are a computationally grounded semantics in the sense
of [21], aimed at representing agents in a distributed setting. We present the
main deﬁnitions here, but refer to the literature for more details.
Consider n agents in a system and n non-empty sets L1, . . . , Ln of local
states, one for every agent of the system, and a set of states for the environment
LE . Elements of Li will be denoted by l1, l
′
1, l2, l
′
2, . . .. Elements of LE will be
denoted by lE, l
′
E , . . ..
A system of global states for n agents S is a non-empty subset of a Carte-
sian product L1 × . . . × Ln × LE . When g = (l1, . . . , ln, lE) is a global state
of a system S, li(g) denotes the local state of agent i in global state g. lE(g)
denotes the local state of the environment in global state g.
We assume that, for every agent in the system and for the environment,
there is a set Acti and ActE of actions that the agents and the environment
can perform. Actions are not executed randomly, but following particular
speciﬁcations that we call protocols. A protocol Pi for agent i is a function
from the set Li of local states to a non-empty set of actions Acti (notice that,
by considering sets of actions, we allow non-determinism in the protocol):
Pi : Li → 2
Acti.
We can then model the evolution of the system by means of a transition
function π from global states and joint actions to global states:
π : S × Act→ S
where S = L1 × . . .× Ln × LE and Act = Act1 × . . .×Actn ×ActE is the set
of joint actions for the system.
Intuitively this deﬁnes temporal ﬂows on the set of global states. Specif-
ically, we consider a set of runs over global states R = {r : IN → S}, where
3 In the formula AG is the modal operator for “forever in the future in all branches”, and
the propositions are to be interpreted in the intuitive way.
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a run r is deﬁned as a function from time to global states, and time ranges
over natural numbers. A run is a sequence of global states that are obtained
by applying the function π to global states and joint actions.
Interpreted Systems can be used to model time and knowledge. To do that,
consider a pair IS = (S, h) where S is a set of global states and h : S → 2P is
an interpretation function for a set of propositional variables P .
Temporal connectives of the type of CTL [16] can then be evaluated on
Interpreted Systems. For the purposes of this paper we are concerned with
epistemic operators. These can be interpreted by means of epistemic modali-
ties Ki, one for each agent, as follows [9]:
(IS , g) |= Ki ϕ if for all g
′ we have that li(g) = li(g
′)
implies (IS , g′) |= ϕ.
The resulting logic for the modalities Ki is S5n; this models agents with
complete introspection capabilities and veridical knowledge.
We shall use Interpreted Systems as a semantic basis to specify a MAS.
They will also be represented in NuSMV in the veriﬁcation process.
3 A methodology for model checking epistemic proper-
ties in Interpreted Systems
While MAS theories encompass a variety of attitudes, in this paper we focus
on knowledge. Being able to verify temporal epistemic properties of a sys-
tem would allow us to reason in terms of temporal evolution of knowledge,
and knowledge about a changing world. We argue that, in particular cases,
veriﬁcation of static properties is adequate. This is so in all circumstances
in which preconditions and postconditions can be stated in terms of logical
propositions. We give an example of this in Section 5.
In order to specify and verify the epistemic properties of a MAS, we identify
the following procedure:
(i) Specify an Interpreted System in terms of local states, proto-
cols, and transitions. We give a concrete example of this in Section 5,
for the protocol of the dining cryptographers.
(ii) Translate the specification of step 1 into an SMV program. This
can be done automatically; a Java program (presented below) can be
used to perform this translation.
(iii) Use a model checker to compute the set of reachable states.
Given a symbolic representation for states and transitions, as the one
obtained in the previous step, the set of reachable states can be computed
as a ﬁxed-point operator [16]. NuSMV provides this facility from version
2.1. Notice that temporal properties of the MAS can be checked at this
stage.
(iv) Build an epistemic model from the set of reachable states. The
5
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Specify interpreted system
Translate specification into NuSMV program
Model check epistemic formulae
Build an epistemic model
Use NuSMV to compute reachable states
XML editor
Parser
Akka
NuSMV
Software toolsProcedures
Java compiler
Fig. 1. Methodology
output of the model checker is used as a starting point for the deﬁnition
of the epistemic model of the original Interpreted System. The epistemic
relations are built automatically, parsing the output of NuSMV by means
of a software we wrote.
(v) Model checking epistemic formulae. In the present paper we use
Akka 4 , a Kripke model editor that supports model testing by Lex Hen-
driks. Akka accepts the description of a model and an evaluation function
and allows formulae to be checked against this input. Akka poses no re-
striction on the syntax of the formulae, so that formulae can involve more
than one modal operator, and modalities can be nested. The model and
the evaluation function (in the syntax of Akka) are provided by the parser
in the previous step.
The methodology is summarised in Figure 1.
4 Translating Interpreted Systems into SMV code
In this section we present the tool that we use to translate Interpreted Systems
into SMV. We ﬁrst state a number of assumptions we make on the speciﬁca-
tion, and then brieﬂy describe the tool.
4.1 Assumptions on the Interpreted System
We restrict our attention to the class of Interpreted Systems with the following
properties:
• Finite systems: we consider systems with a ﬁnite number of local states
and actions. This is a limitation, but adequate for many examples where
the set of state is ﬁnite.
• Initial configuration: we are required to specify the number of agents,
local states and actions when setting up the model. Hence, the maximum
4 http://turing.wins.uva.nl/∼lhendrik/
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number of local states cannot change at run-time.
• Local states: we assume that local states can be represented as a list of
variables, each having a ﬁnite range of values. More in detail, consider an
agent i: the local state Li is a tuple Li = 〈v1,i, . . . , vn,i〉 where each vn,i
ranges over a ﬁnite set of values (see Section 5 for an example).
• Evolution function: In the description below we use a slightly modiﬁed
and simpler syntax for π (see Section 2.2); the idea is to decompose the ﬁnal
global states of the function π. We consider n evolution functions, one for
each agent, πi : S × Act→ Li (i = 1, . . . , n) from global states and actions
to local states of agent i. In the tool, we shall list only the global states and
actions that cause a change in the local state of agent i, and assume that,
if a global state is not listed in the deﬁnition of some πi, then this global
state is not relevant in the evolution of Li.
4.2 Input and Output of the Java Translator
The speciﬁcation of an Interpreted System is required as an input for the Java
translator. This speciﬁcation must contain at least the following informations:
1. Number of agents.
2. Number of local states and actions for each agent.
3. Number of variables in each local state, for each agent; values of each
variable in the local state.
4. Protocol as a function from local states (i.e. set of variables) to actions,
one for each agent.
5. Initial state(s).
6. Transition functions from local states and actions to a single local state
(see previous Section).
These parameters are read from an XML ﬁle. The following is a schematic
representation of the speciﬁcation of an Interpreted System, as it is read by
the translator 5 :
<is>
<agent name="Agt1">
<localstates nvar="1">
[...]
</localstates>
<actions number="3">
[...]
</actions>
<protocol>
[...]
</protocol>
</agent>
5 A DTD for the speciﬁcation of Interpreted Systems can be found at:
http://www.dcs.kcl.ac.uk/pg/franco/is/is.dtd.
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[...]
<evFunct>
<agtEvFunct agtname="Agt1">
<transition>
[...]
</transition>
</agtEvFunct>
</evFunct>
</is>
The protocol and the evolution functions are speciﬁed as sets of pairs (local
state, actions) and (global state + actions, local state). For the evolution
functions, we assume that if a global state and/or action is not listed, then it
does not aﬀect the change of the local state of the agent.
We chose to use XML to specify Interpreted Systems for the following
reasons:
• The description of an Interpreted System requires the speciﬁcation of simple
data structures such as lists and maps, and XML allows for the description
of this kind of semi-structured data.
• Parsers and checkers are freely available for most of the programming lan-
guages, thus enabling an easier integration with existing tools.
• The proposed DTD can be extended following new requirements.
Editing an XML ﬁle can be cumbersome, and we are currently developing
a graphical interface to make the input of the parameters easier.
Given the input above, an SMV program is generated by the translator;
each agent has two variables, one for a list of local states, and one for a list
of actions. Local states are computed automatically from the list of local
variables.
Essentially, the protocol in the Interpreted System gives the rules to com-
pute the evolution of actions in the SMV code. The evolution function from
the speciﬁcation of the Interpreted System is used to create the block of SMV
code needed for the transition functions between the variables representing
local states.
The Java software performing the translation can be obtained from the
authors of this paper.
5 A communication example: The Dining Cryptogra-
pher
It is known that Interpreted Systems provide a good abstraction model to
specify and verify the behaviour of systems. The tool presented in Section 4,
apart from being an exercise in compilation of speciﬁcations, allows us to go
from an abstract description of an Interpreted System to the execution traces
of it in a format that is compatible to one of the leading model checkers.
8
Raimondi and Lomuscio
We are interested in specifying systems via Interpreted Systems because
we regard them as promising in the veriﬁcation of communication protocols,
as demonstrated in [9,19]. We test this belief by using the scenario of the
Dining Cryptographers, provided by Chaum [6].
In his paper, Chaum shows how messages can be broadcasted anonymously.
In particular, he shows that protocols exist that allow for the change in the
knowledge of the participants about some global property of the system, with-
out them being able to detect the source of this information.
5.1 Statement of the Problem
The Dining Cryptographers scenario is introduced in [6] as follows:
“Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favourite three-
star restaurant. Their waiter informs them that arrangements have been made
with the maitre d’hotel for the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryp-
tographers might be paying for the dinner, or it might have been NSA (U.S.
National Security Agency). The three cryptographers respect each other’s right
to make an anonymous payment, but they wonder if NSA is paying. They re-
solve their uncertainty fairly by carrying out the following protocol:
Each cryptographer ﬂips an unbiased coin behind his menu, between him
and the cryptographer on his right, so that only the two of them can see the
outcome. Each cryptographer then states aloud whether the two coins he can
see – the one he ﬂipped and the one his left-hand neighbour ﬂipped – fell on
the same side or on diﬀerent sides. If one of the cryptographers is the payer,
he states the opposite of what he sees. An odd number of diﬀerences uttered
at the table indicates that a cryptographer is paying; an even number indicates
that NSA is paying (assuming that the dinner was paid for only once). Yet if
a cryptographer is paying, neither of the other two learns anything from the
utterances about which cryptographer it is.”[6]
Notice that the same protocol works for any number of cryptographers
either greater or equal to three (see [6]).
5.2 The Interpreted System of the Dining Cryptographers
We analyse the scenario above by means of Interpreted Systems semantics. We
introduce three agents Ci, i = {1, 2, 3}, to model the three cryptographers,
and one agent E for the environment. In our representation the environment
is used to (non-deterministically) select the initial conﬁguration of the payer
and the results of coin tosses.
We represent the local state LCi for each cryptographer Ci with a tuple
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LCi = 〈v1, v2, v3〉 where
6 :
v1 =


λ the initial state
NotPaid if the agent did not pay for the dinner
Paid if the agent paid for the dinner
v2 =


λ initial state
Diﬀerent if the left coin is diﬀerent from the
right coin for Ci
Equal if the left coin is equal to the right coin
v3 =


λ initial state
Odd odd number of diﬀerences uttered
Even even number of diﬀerences uttered
Local states for the environment are tuples LE of the form
LE = 〈ChA,ChB,ChC, payer〉 where ChA,ChB,ChC are the “channels”
between the Cryptographers, with value randomly selected at the beginning
of the run being Head or Tail (the outcome of the coin toss), and
payer =


1 if C1 paid for the dinner
2 if C2 paid for the dinner
3 if C3 paid for the dinner
4 if the NSA paid for the dinner
The actions for the cryptographers are:
ActC1 = ActC2 = ActC3 = {λ, say(equal), say(not equal)}
where λ denotes a null action.
We assume that the environment is not performing any action: ActE = λ.
Hence, there is no protocol for the environment 7 .
6 From now on we will denote an empty or undeﬁned state by λ.
7 Equivalently one can think of a protocol mapping every local state for the environment
to the null action λ.
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The protocol PCi for the cryptographers is:
PCi(LCi) =


say(equal) if LCi is of the form
〈 NotPaid,Equal,* 〉 or
〈 Paid,NotEqual,* 〉
say(not equal) if LCi is of the form
〈 NotPaid,NotEqual,* 〉 or
〈 Paid,Equal,* 〉
λ all the remaining cases
We now deﬁne the initial state for the system. We take the following initial
state for the agents representing the cryptographers:
init(LC1) = init(LC2) = init(LC3) = 〈λ, λ, λ〉
The initial state for the environment is randomly selected from the set of
possible combinations of values for Channels (Head or Tail) and payer (one of
the cryptographers or the NSA).
The evolution of the system is modelled by the transition function π :
G×Act→ G, where G = LC1 × LC2 × LC3 × LE is the set of global states,
and Act = ActC1 × ActC2 × ActC3 × ActE. Notice that we can skip the
evolution of LE and the dependences from ActE in the deﬁnition of π, thanks
to our assumptions on the environment (no actions, and local state ﬁxed at
the beginning of the run).
Even so, the deﬁnition of π is too long to report; we will give here only
two examples:
π(〈λ, λ, λ〉, 〈λ, λ, λ〉, 〈λ, λ, λ〉, 〈head,tail,head, 1〉, λ, λ, λ, λ)
=
(〈Paid,Diﬀerent, λ〉, 〈NotPaid,Diﬀerent, λ〉,
〈NotPaid,Diﬀerent, λ〉,
〈Head,Tail,Head, 1〉)
The above represents the fact that in the initial state in which the results of
coin tosses are Head, Tail, Head for ChA, ChB, and ChC respectively, and
in which the ﬁrst cryptographer paid for the dinner, there exists a transition
to a state where C1 has value Paid for the local variable v1, while the others
cryptographers have NotPaid.
At the next time step the cryptographers utter the appropriate sentence
(equal or not equal), following their protocol. This enables the transitions for
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the evaluation of the last variable, v3:
π(〈Paid, NotEqual, λ〉, 〈,NotPaid, NotEqual, λ〉,
〈NotPaid, NotEqual, λ〉,
〈Head,Tail,Head, 1〉,
say(equal), say(not equal), say(not equal), λ)
=
(〈Paid,NotEqual,Odd〉,
〈NotPaid,NotEqual,Odd〉,
〈NotPaid,NotEqual,Odd〉,
〈Head,Tail,Head, 1〉)
This is the ﬁnal state of the system. A similar analysis can be carried out
for all the other remaining cases.
5.3 The Methodology in Practice
Following the considerations above, we encoded the Interpreted System for the
dining Cryptographers as an XML ﬁle. Speciﬁcally, this contains four agents,
three variables for the local states of the Cryptographers, four variables for
the environment, two actions for the Cryptographers.
The deﬁnition of the evolution function is the most cumbersome step.
However, thanks to our assumptions of Section 4.1, we can specify only the
global states and actions that actually cause a change on local states.
For example, under this assumption, the ﬁrst cryptographer can be mod-
elled with transitions of the form:
〈Paid, Equal, λ〉 if (〈λ, λ, λ〉, ∗, 〈1,Head, Head, ∗〉, ), (∗)
or (〈λ, λ, λ〉, ∗, 〈1,Tail, Tail, ∗〉, ), (∗)
This represents the fact that the ﬁrst Cryptographer would change his local
state to 〈Paid, Equal, λ〉 only if he was in the local state 〈λ, λ, λ〉 and the
environment was 〈1,Head, Head, ∗〉 or 〈1,Tail, Tail, ∗〉.
Similarly, it is possible to deﬁne all the remaining conditions causing a
transition for the ﬁrst cryptographer; these, together with the transitions for
the other cryptographers and the environment, are encoded in XML for the
Java translator.
One can feed this speciﬁcation into the translator and produce the SMV
code for the example 8 . NuSMV can then be used to generate the set of
reachable states. For this example, these are 96 out of 629856 possible combi-
nations of local states and actions, as they are represented in NuSMV. Both
8 The code is available at: http://www.dcs.kcl.ac.uk/pg/franco/is/dincry2.smv.
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the translation of the speciﬁcation into SMV code and the computation of the
set of reachable states require less than one second on a 500 MHz PC with
256 Mbytes of RAM. The reachable states are stored in a text ﬁle that can be
processed by the parser to produce the epistemic model ISd in Akka’s format.
5.4 Model Checking the Formulae
We deﬁne a set of atomic propositions {paid1, paid2, paid3, even, odd} that
we can interpret in a natural way in the model ISd obtained by following the
process described above. Notice that {even, odd} are true upon termination
of the protocol, thus giving the required postconditions for the evaluation of
epistemic formulae 9 :
(ISd, g) |= paid1 if lC1(g) = 〈Paid, ∗, ∗〉
(ISd, g) |= paid2 if lC2(g) = 〈Paid, ∗, ∗〉
(ISd, g) |= paid3 if lC2(g) = 〈Paid, ∗, ∗〉
(ISd, g) |= even if lCi(g) = 〈∗, ∗,Even〉 for every i
(ISd, g) |= odd if lCi(g) = 〈∗, ∗,Odd〉 for every i
With Akka we can easily check the following propositions:
IS d |= odd→ (¬paid1 → (KC1(paid2 ∨ paid3)
∧
¬KC1(paid2) ∧ ¬KC1(paid3)))
IS d |= even→ KC1(¬paid1 ∧ ¬paid2 ∧ ¬paid3)
These two formulae conﬁrm the correctness of the statement of section 5.1:
if the ﬁrst cryptographer did not pay for the dinner and there is an odd
number of diﬀerences in the utterances, then the ﬁrst cryptographer knows
that either the second or the third cryptographer paid for the dinner; moreover,
in this case, the ﬁrst cryptographer does not know which one of the remaining
cryptographers is the payer.
Conversely, if the number of diﬀerences in the utterances is even, then the
ﬁrst cryptographer knows that nobody paid for the dinner.
Interestingly, in our model the following is not valid:
ISd |= ¬paid1 → (KC1(¬paid1 ∧ ¬paid2 ∧ ¬paid3)
∨
(KC1(paid2 ∨ paid3) ∧ ¬KC1(paid2) ∧ ¬KC1(paid2)))
9 In the following, g will denote a global state; lCi(g) will denote the local state for Cryp-
tographer i in global state g; 〈Paid, ∗, ∗〉 will be a local state in which the ﬁrst variable is
Paid and all the other variables are allowed to have any value.
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Also, we have:
ISd |= ¬paid1 → (KC1(¬paid1 ∧ ¬paid2 ∧ ¬paid3)
∨
KC1(paid2 ∨ paid3))
Indeed, consider a global state in which the local state for C1 is
〈NotPaid,Diﬀerent,λ〉 (such a global state exists in the set of reachable global
states). In this state paid1 does not hold; also, in this local states there is
no information about the parity of the utterances and C1 considers possible
global states in which parity is Odd, and others in which parity is Even. In the
ﬁrst case, ¬paid1 ∧ ¬paid2 ∧¬paid3 does not hold in a global state that C1
considers possible. In the second case paid2∨paid3 is false, thus invalidating
KC1(paid2 ∨ paid3).
6 Conclusions
Logic has always been of use in the analysis of communication in multi-agent
systems, both for the case of humans and computers. To date, veriﬁcation
of communication protocols has been limited to the use of theorem provers,
and model checkers limited to temporal languages. While this is appropriate
for the low-level communication protocols used in networking, complex multi-
agent systems following in spirit the intentional stance need richer languages.
The problem with using richer languages to verify these protocols is that
current provers and checkers are not suited to represent other modalities such
as knowledge. In this paper we have attempted to take a step in this direction,
by providing a path from a concrete speciﬁcation of a multi-agent system to
the construction of execution traces, and checking of properties.
Speciﬁcally, we have here presented a tool for model checking epistemic
formulae in multi-agent systems. We have used Interpreted Systems as a
framework for the speciﬁcation of MAS and we have suggested how a model
checker for temporal models (NuSMV) may be used in the veriﬁcation of
epistemic properties. A software tool to provide the necessary translation was
discussed.
The tool provided has been tested on a well known scenario in commu-
nication: the protocol of the dining cryptographers. In the future we would
like to test other scenarios, particularly from the security literature. In that
exercise it would be instructive to check whether a static analysis is suﬃcient
(as it is claimed by [5] in their inﬂuential paper on BAN logic), or whether a
move to a temporal epistemic is required. While this analysis is in progress
we are currently planning to add a graphical interface to the tool so that a
speciﬁcation of Interpreted Systems can be given graphically.
The issue of scalability of this approach is also one that we would like to
investigate further. Preliminary results seem to indicate that the phases of
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compilation into SMV, the construction of the set of global states, and the
testing of epistemic formulae all scale up fairly well. Still, we would not ex-
pect this approach to be compared in speed with the fastest methodologies
available. What we do ﬁnd of interest here is that a bridge was made be-
tween speciﬁcation of a protocol and model checking, by means of automatic
compilation of one speciﬁcation into another, thereby allowing for epistemic
properties to be veriﬁed.
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